Hi @nanbingxyz,
I recently ran a security audit on 5ire as part of research on MCP client security posture across the ecosystem.
Found a couple of items worth flagging:
1. Tool description injection risk
As a cross-platform MCP client compatible with major providers, 5ire renders tool descriptions from connected servers without validating them against adversarial patterns. A single malicious MCP server can poison the entire tool namespace for any agent session.
2. Missing output sanitization
Tool outputs from connected MCP servers are forwarded to the model context without sanitization. The client layer is the highest-leverage point to add this protection — one fix covers every server users connect.
Both are in a full audit report — 8-page PDF with CVSS ratings, EU AI Act mapping, and remediation steps — for $29 at luciferforge.github.io/mcp-security-audit/
Demo: https://luciferforge.github.io/mcp-audit-reports/
— Lucifer / LuciferForge Security
Hi @nanbingxyz,
I recently ran a security audit on 5ire as part of research on MCP client security posture across the ecosystem.
Found a couple of items worth flagging:
1. Tool description injection risk
As a cross-platform MCP client compatible with major providers, 5ire renders tool descriptions from connected servers without validating them against adversarial patterns. A single malicious MCP server can poison the entire tool namespace for any agent session.
2. Missing output sanitization
Tool outputs from connected MCP servers are forwarded to the model context without sanitization. The client layer is the highest-leverage point to add this protection — one fix covers every server users connect.
Both are in a full audit report — 8-page PDF with CVSS ratings, EU AI Act mapping, and remediation steps — for $29 at luciferforge.github.io/mcp-security-audit/
Demo: https://luciferforge.github.io/mcp-audit-reports/
— Lucifer / LuciferForge Security